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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
By Order of the Utah Supreme Court, this case was poured-over
to the Utah Court of Appeals on November 6, 1995. This Court has
jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)
(Supp. 1995) and Utah R. App. P. 3.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
I.

Whether the trial court erred in finding no genuine issue

of material fact as to the existence of an express or an implied
compensation contract between Gina Cook

("Mrs. Cook") and her

employer Zions First National Bank ("Zions") when Mrs. Cook was
employed in consideration for certain compensation which included
the ability and flexibility to take earned leave for needed medical
care.
This issue was preserved in the trial court. See, inter
Record ("R") . at 251-52; 304-05;

510;

alia,

308; 332-33; 334; 437-39; 474-81;

515-16; 524-25. The standard of review for summary judgment

is Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
judgments are reviewed for correctness.

Summary

Palmer v. Hayesf 892 P.2d

1059, 1061 (Utah App. 1995).x
II.

Whether the covenant of good faith and fair dealing

exists within the confines of employment compensation contracts,
and assuming that it does, whether the trial court erred in finding
1

See also the section on Applicable Law,
1

infra.

no genuine issue of material fact as to Zions1 performance under
that implied covenant when Mrs, Cook repeatedly requested the
opportunity to use her earned sick leave to determine if the lump
on her lip was cancerous, and Zions denied her requests and by its
conduct, prevented her from so doing.
This issue was preserved in the trial court. See, inter

alia,

R. at 252-53; 307-11; 324-25; 349-48; 474-81; 521; 524; 527-30;
534-35; 567. The standard of review for summary judgment is Rule
56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
reviewed for correctness.

Summary judgments are

Palmerf 892 P.2d at 1061.

III. Whether the trial court erred by resolving factual
disputes against Mrs. Cook and by relying on issues neither raised
by Zions nor properly considered in a Motion for Summary Judgment.
This issue was preserved in the trial court. See, inter

alia,

R. at 60-86; 302-366; 386-435; 474-81; 493-95; 493-95; 474-81; 54446.

The standard of review for summary judgment is Rule 56(c) of

the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
for correctness.

Summary judgments are reviewed

Palmerf 892 P.2d at 1061.2

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION AND DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
None.

2

Mrs. Cook is not pursuing her claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress on appeal.
2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
X.

Nature of the Case
This is an action brought by Mrs. Cook as the result of Zions1

breach of her employment compensation contract.

Mrs. Cook claims

that Zions breached her contract, which specifically included the
right to paid sick leave, by refusing to allow her time off for
medical treatment when she needed and requested it.
II.

Course of the Proceedings
The Complaint was filed on September 14, 1994 in the Third

Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County.

(R. at 2.)

Mrs.

Cook demanded a jury, and tendered the appropriate fee on September
28, 1994.

(R. at 31.)

Zions served its Answer on October 11,

1994, (R. at 34), and ten days later, on October 21, 1994, filed a
Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. at 60.)

In its accompanying

memorandum, Zions raised several issues claiming, in pertinent
part, that "there is no express employment contract", that "Utah law
does not recognize a breach of an implied-in-fact contract outside
of the termination context" and that "an implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing is not recognized in the employment context
under Utah law."

(R. at 63-64; 386-87.)

III. Disposition of the Trial Court
Judge David Young accommodated lengthy oral argument on March
10, 1995, (R. at 572-97) and April 21, 1995.
3

(R. at 508-71.)

On

June 8, 1995, the trial court ruled against Mrs. Cook in a
Memorandum Decision, attached hereto as Addendum "A".

(R. at 474.)

Final judgment, granting summary judgment against Mrs. Cook and
dismissing her action on the merits and with prejudice, was entered
on July 14, 1995.
18, 1995.

(R. at 490.) Notice of Appeal was filed on July

(R. at 496.)
STATEMENT OF FACTS

I.

General Background:
1.

Mrs. Cook was hired by Zions in May, 1988.

(R. at 65;

95; 250.)
2.

During her full-time employment at Zions, the terms and

conditions of Mrs. Cook's compensation, including sick leave, have
not changed, although she has received regular pay increases for
merit and promotion.
3.

Mrs. Cook has not been terminated by Zions, where she

remains employed.
II.

(R. 250-51; 304.)

(R. at 95; 250-51; 304.)

Facts Presented to the Trial Court in Opposition to Zions'
Factual Claims That Mrs. Cook Had No Contract Providing for
Compensation in Exchange for Her Services to the Bank:
4.

In May 1988, prior to her acceptance of Zions1 offer of

employment, Mrs. Cook met with Joyce Misdom, the manager of the
department in which Mrs. Cook was to be employed.

During that

meeting, Ms. Misdom advised her that after an initial 90-day
waiting period, Mrs. Cook would automatically earn credits for
4

u

involuntary leaves of absence from work/ which would entitle her

to a certain number of paid sick days, depending on whether she
worked part or full time.
5.

(R. at 437.)

While Mrs. Cook was considering Zions1 employment offer,

another representative of the bank met with Mrs. Cook and again
explained the terms of Zions1 compensation package which included
paid leaves of absences for sick days.

During that meeting, Mrs.

Cook was again told that she would earn and be entitled to use paid
sick leave as part of her compensation.
6.

Mrs. Cook accepted employment at Zions based on its offer

of employment compensation.
7.

(R. at 437.)

(R. at 438).

Zions' employment offer, as communicated by Ms. Misdom

and the other bank representative, was memorialized in a written
agreement.

(R. at 437-38.)

That document, entitled "Employment

Benefits Disclosure and Pay Agreement" (hereinafter "Employment
Agreement"), is attached hereto as Addendum "B". (R. at 438; 441.)
8.

After Mrs. Cook had received an explanation of her

compensation from Ms. Misdom and the other bank representative, she
and Ms. Misdom signed the Employment Agreement on July 28, 1988.
(R. at 438; 441.)
9.

The Employment Agreement lists both Mrs. Cookfs initial

salary and earned benefits, including involuntary paid leaves of

5

absence3 for which she would become automatically eligible as part
of her compensation package.

Specifically, with respect to sick

leave, the Employment Agreement states:
Involuntary Absences from Work (leave credit 90-day
waiting period) —
1 day per month for full-time
employees; 1 day (8 hours) per 2 months for those working
at least 20 hours per week.
(R. at 438; 441.)
10.

The flexibility of being able to take paid sick leave was

a significant part of Mrs. Cook's compensation package, and was an
important inducement to her in accepting Zions' employment offer.
(R. at 438-39.)
Because Zions1 compensation package included paid sick

11.

leave, Mrs. Cook was willing to work at an hourly rate lower than
the rate she received from her former employer.
12.

(R. at

438.)

Since accepting its employment offer, Mrs. Cook has

continued to rely on Zions1 representations to provide paid sick
leave, and has for years earned and used the benefit of paid sick
leave.

(R. at 251-52; 304-06; 308; 439.)

13.

It was Mrs. Cook's understanding from Zions' course of

dealing, representations and practices, that, as a full-time
employee,

she

would

receive

paid

3

sick

leave

in

partial

Zions' use of the phrase "involuntary leaves of absences" in
its Employment Agreement, (R. at 441), is synonymous with the terms
"sick leave", "sick days" and "short term leave" in the record. See,
inter alia,
R. at 326; 332-33; 335-37; 344-45; 351-53.
6

consideration for her service to the bank.

(R. at 251-52; 436-37;

439.)
14.

Consistent with its practices, Mrs. Cook's Employment

Agreement and her understanding of her sick leave benefits, Zions
also has a written policy regarding sick leave which is maintained
by supervisors and not distributed to employees.

(R. at 351-52;

391.)
III. Facts Presented to the Trial Court Based on Zions9 Admissions:
15.

Zions1

employees earn sick leave as part of their

compensation. (R. at 332-33.)
16.

Employees who take sick leave are paid at their normal

hourly or salaried rate, with standard taxes and withholdings
deducted from the sick leave compensation.
17.

(R. at 326.)

Full time employees earn the right to be paid for sick

leave and can accumulate eight hours a month for a maximum of 12
days a year.
18.

(R. at 325-26; 334-35; 344; 351-53.)

Pay stubs given to Mrs. Cook by Zions confirm its policy

of providing Mrs. Cook with earned sick leave.
19.

(R. at 321.)

Zions maintains a schedule of the number of hours to

which an employee is entitled for sick leave, based on how long
they have worked.
20.

(R. at 335; 345; 351.)

At the beginning of 1994, Mrs. Cook had earned 249.76

hours of sick leave.

(R. at 336.)
7

21.

As an employer, Zions provides sick leave in order to be

competitive and to promote the health of its employees.

(R. at

325.)
22.

Zions1 policy and practice is to allow its employees time

off to obtain necessary medical attention, diagnosis and treatment
before

treatable

threatening.
23.

health

problems

become

serious

or

life

(R. at 471-72.)

Zions

publishes

an

official

newsletter

known

as

"Newsbreak", which is disseminated regularly to employees. (R. at
323 and 348.)
24.

Zions1 September 20, 1994 Newsbreak states in pertinent

part that *[t]he health and welfare of employees are important to
Zions Bancorporation.

Zions policies provide employees with

adequate time to seek needed medical treatment.n

(R. at 349.)

(Emphasis added.) A copy of the Newsbreak article is attached
hereto as Addendum "C".
25.

The Newsbreak article is an accurate statement of the

bankfs position#
very well."
26.

(R. at 348; 435), and "depicts [Zions1 policy]

(R. at 411.)

Zions1

employees

are

required

to

notify

their

departmental supervisors of their need to take sick leave for
scheduled medical procedures.

(R. at 327.)

8

27.

Zions' employees are also required to obtain approval

from their supervisors before they can use sick leave for scheduled
medical treatment.
IV.

(R. at 344; 471-72.)

Facts Presented to the Trial Court Regarding the Material
Breach of Mrs. Cook's Compensation Agreement:
28.

In a January, 1994 staff meeting, Gaylene Kenney ("Ms.

Kenney"), Mrs. Cookfs departmental manager, (R. at 306; 330; 389),
stated that she did not want anyone to take time off during the
next several months because of an increased workload

in the

department caused by the department's conversion to a new computer
system, and Zions1 acquisition of another bank.

(R. at 252; 309;

355) .
29.

Because of the demands placed on her as a result of the

conversion to the new computer system and the bank acquisition,
Mrs. Cook was required to work extensive overtime in the first few
months of 1994.
30.

(R. at 252; 309.)

By the beginning of 1994, a lump had appeared on Mrs.

Cook's lip. The lump was obvious and could readily be seen by coworkers.
31.

(R. at 308; 340-41; 356-57; 361.)
Ms. Kenney also knew of the lump because she could see it

on Mrs. Cook's lip.
32.

(R. at 308; 340-41.)

On January 29, 1994, Mrs. Cook requested one hour off on

February 1, 1994 to have the lump on her lip removed.
309; 362.)
9

(R. at 252;

33.

Mrs. Kenney approved the request for one hour.

(R. at

338-39; 362.)
34.
1994.

Mrs. Cook went to her doctor's appointment on February 1,

However, at that time, her doctor decided that the procedure

would take a full day and would need to be done in a hospital.
Therefore, because only a one hour office appointment had been
scheduled, Mrs. Cookfs doctor did not remove the lump.

(R. at 252;

309.)
35.

After returning to work, Mrs. Cook approached Ms. Kenney,

and requested one day off for the in-hospital surgical procedure to
remove the lump on her lower lip as directed by her doctor. (R. at
252; 309.)
36.

That

request,

and

several

other

requests

for

the

necessary time off made during the first week of February, 1994 and
in the following months, were denied.
37.

(R. at 252; 309-10.)

Mrs. Cook did not take a day off without Ms. Kenney1 s

permission because she feared that she would be terminated for
violating Zions1 policy and Ms. Kenney's directive.
38.

During

February,

March

and April,

(R. at 343.)

1994, Mrs. Cook

continued to make numerous requests to Ms. Kenney to use one day of
her earned sick leave for the medical procedure.
309-10.)

10

(R. at 252-53;

39.

Ms. Kenney denies that these requests were made.

(R. at

341; 390; 433-34; 475; 546.)
40.

The surgical procedure was eventually undertaken on May

20, 1994 with Ms. Kenneyfs approval.
41.

(R. at 253.)

On May 31, 1994, Mrs. Cook was notified that she had a

form of aggressive, malignant melanoma.

(R. at 253-54; 310.)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In 1988, Mrs. Cook and Zions signed an Employment Agreement in
which Zions expressly agreed to compensate her with the earned
benefit of sick leave. Based on that agreement and Zions9 policies
and practices, Mrs. Cook's sick leave accrued at the rate of one
day for every month she worked as a full time employee.

For

several years, Mrs. Cook earned, requested and received her sick
leave as part of her compensation.

Prior to her denied requests

for time off, Zions had not changed or disclaimed either Mrs.
Cook's

contract

or

Zions1

existing

policy

and

practice

of

compensating its employees with accrued sick leave for needed
medical treatment. This practice continued until the first several
months of 1994 when Mrs. Cook's supervisor denied her requests for
one day of sick leave to undergo an in-hospital procedure to remove
and biopsy a lump on her lip.

During those months, Mrs. Cook's

supervisor required her to work extensive overtime as the result of
an exceptionally heavy work load in Mrs. Cook's department.
11

As of January 1, 1994 Mrs Cook had 249.76 accrued and unused
hours of earned sick leave.

Zions, however, requires its employees

to obtain approval before taking time off for scheduled medical
treatment.

Although the sore on Mrs. Cookfs lower lip did not heal

and continued to worsen in February, March, April and May of 1994,
Mrs. Cookfs repeated requests for a single day of sick leave were
continually denied.

Not being able to jeopardize her job and

health insurance and not knowing whether she had a serious problem,
Mrs. Cook continued to work while pressing her supervisor for
permission for a day off work for the surgery.
When Zions finally allowed Mrs. Cook time off on May 20, 1994,
her physicians found an aggressive form of skin cancer which had
metastasized and invaded her lymph nodes. Mrs. Cookfs physicians
have informed her that her condition is terminal.

Zions' refusal

to allow Mrs. Cook time off work caused a critical and significant
delay in her cancer treatment, resulting in the progression of the
cancer and the loss of any opportunity to prevent that progression.
Zions has admitted that the purpose of its policy and practice
of allowing employees time off work for medical procedures is to
allow them to obtain necessary medical attention before health
problems become serious or life threatening.

The terms of Mrs.

Cook's compensation contract were breached by Zions1 refusals to
allow her time off when she requested it.
12

Based on Zions1 own

statement, that "Zions policies provide employees with adequate
time to seek needed medical treatment/ (R. at 349) , it has also
breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing which
exists in Utah and operates within

the parameters of all contracts,

including contracts providing for employment compensation.
ARGUMENT
I.

Applicable Law under Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
Summary judgment is only proper when "there is no genuine

issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P 56(c);

Republic Group, Inc»

v. Won-Door Corp.f 883 P.2d 285 (Utah App. 1994).

When reviewing

an order granting summary judgment, the evidence and all inferences
that may be reasonably drawn from the evidence must be liberally
construed in favor of the party opposing the motion.
Groupf

883 P.2d at 289.

Republic

The non-movant is required only to

demonstrate that there is a material issue of fact, not that its
case is more persuasive than the movant1s. Lamb v. B&B Amusementsf
869 P.2d 926 (Utah 1993).

Any doubts as to whether the non-moving

party has established an issue of material fact must be resolved in
favor of the non-movant.
(Utah 1992).

Butterfield v. Okudor 831 P.2d 97, 107

The determination of whether the moving party is

entitled to a judgment is a question of law, and given this view of
the evidence, is reviewed for correctness.
13

Palmer, 892 P.2d at

1061; Kleinert vf Kimball Elevator Co., 854 p.2d 1025, 1027 (Utah
App.

1993).

No deference is accorded to the trial court1s

conclusion that the facts are not in dispute or to the trial
courtfs legal conclusions based on those facts. Kitchen v. Cal Gas
QSL^, 821 P.2d 458 (Utah App. 1991), cert, denied, 879 P.2d 476
(Utah 1994).

Summary judgment is generally considered to be a

drastic remedy which requires strict compliance with Rule 56 of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
1181 (Utah 1983).

Timm v. Dewsnupr 851 P.2d 1178,

Accordingly, summary judgment is appropriate

only if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
II.

The Trial Court Erred in Finding No Genuine Issue of Material
Fact as to the Existence of an Express or an Implied
Compensation Contract Between Mrs. Cook and Her Employer,
Zions.
In its Motion For Summary Judgment, Zions claimed it has no

contract with its employee, Mrs. Cook.

Zions stated in absolute

terms that it "does not enter into any individual employment
agreements with its employees and did not do so with respect to
plaintiff." (R. at 65.)

The trial court, adopting a misdirected

employment-at-will analysis, agreed, ruling that
The first cause of action for 'Breach of Express
Employment Contract1 must be and the same is dismissed
because there is no employment contract between the
14

parties. Utah law presumes that any employment contract
with no specified term as to duration is an 'at-will1

relationship. Berube v, Fashion Center, Ltflt, 771 p.2d
1033, (Utah 1989). Nothing in evidence can be shown to
have changed the initial 'at-will1 relationship. Even in
cases where an 'at-will' employee has no right of action
against its employer for breach of employment contract
upon being discharged,
(Brehany v. Nordstromf Inc.f 812
P.2d 49 [Utah 1991]) in this case, since there has been
no discharge,
there exists an even stronger reason to
disallow an [sic] suit for Breach of Contract.
The
Plaintiff remains employed yet wishes to maintain her
lawsuit for breach of contract while going to work every
day and continuing to receive employee benefits and
income.
R. at 478.)

(Emphasis in original.)

The trial court's analysis

and conclusion were wrong. The fact that Mrs. Cook may be employed
at-will is not relevant to her claims that Zions breached her
contractual right to take time off work when necessary for illness
or needed medical treatment.

The central issue before the trial

court and on appeal is whether a reasonable jury could find an
employment contract for certain compensation, including, in part,
the right to request and receive paid sick leave, regardless of
whether that contract could be terminated by either party.
A.

Significant Facts in the Record Support Mrs. Cook's Claim
That She Had a Contract for Compensation Which Included
Paid Sick Leave.

The claim that Mrs. Cook had an agreement with Zions to
provide

services

in

exchange

for

compensation

was

strongly

supported by the evidence before the trial court and therefore
should have been decided by the finder of fact.
15

The record

demonstrates that Zions offered Mrs. Cook employment which she
accepted

in consideration

for certain compensation

and which

included the ability and flexibility to take involuntary leaves of
absence when needed for medical care.

(R. at 251-52; 305; 332-33;

437-39.)
Prior to beginning employment, Zions informed Mrs. Cook that
as part of her compensation, she would automatically earn credits
for involuntary leaves of absence from work, and would therefore be
entitled to a certain number of paid sick days.

(R. at 437.)

Based on the employment offer made by Zions1 representatives, which
was memorialized by the Employment Agreement, Mrs. Cook accepted
employment.

(R. at 438; 441; Addendum ttB".) The flexibility

which

involuntary paid sick leave offered was a significant part of Mrs.
Cook's compensation package, and was an important inducement to her
in accepting Zions' employment offer.

(R. at 438-39.)

Since accepting Zions1 offer, Mrs. Cook has relied on its
agreement to provide paid sick leave, and on several occasions, has
used that sick leave.

(R. at 251-52; 304-06; 308; 439.)

Pay stubs

given to Mrs. Cook by Zions regularly documented Zions1 policy of
providing her earned sick leave which was treated as normal
compensation, subject to withholdings, taxes, etc. (R. at 321; 326;
351.)
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Mrs. Cook's understanding from Zions' course of dealings,
representations and practices, was that she would receive paid sick
leave in partial consideration for her service to the bank.

(R. at

439.) Mrs. Cook's sick leave was not a mere gratuity; it was part
of the bargained-for compensation she was to receive for the
services she rendered.

The evidence makes it clear that an express

contract had been entered into by the parties# and moreover, that
the contract had been performed and confirmed by their conduct
through a course of dealing lasting several years.

An integral

part of that contract included Mrs. Cook's ability and flexibility
to request and receive earned sick leave when needed.
B.

The Relationship Between an Employer and an Employee Is
Contractual Regardless of Whether That Relationship Is
Terminable At-Will.

The trial court noted that Mrs. Cook and Zions have an "atwill" relationship, and then somehow concluded that since Mrs. Cook
had not been terminated, there could be no action for breach of
contract.
not,

(R. at 478.)

and has

never

meant

The concept of "employment at-will" does
that there is no employment contract

between an employer and its employee; it simply means that the
employment contract has no specific duration, and is terminable at
the will of either party. The Supreme Court in Berube stated: "The
at-will rule, after all, is merely a rule of contract

construction

and not a legal principle . . . The rule creates a presumption that
17

any employment

contract

which has no specified term of duration is

an at-will relationship."

Berubef

771 P.2d at 1044.

(Emphasis

added; internal citation omitted.)
It belies the obvious to state that an employer and its
employees have no contract.

At the very least, employees report

for work each day, in exchange for compensation.4

An employer-

employee relationship is necessarily based on an agreement that, in
exchange for services rendered by the employee, the employer will
timely

pay

wages

and

provide

earned

benefits.

Whether

the

employment relationship is for a definite period or terminable atwill, that obligation continues, unless modified by the parties,
until the relationship

is terminated.

In Johnson v. Morton

Thiokolf 818 P.2d 997 (Utah 1991), the Supreme Court stated that
an employers promise of employment under certain terms
and for an indefinite period constitutes both the terms
of the
employment
contract
and the
employer's
consideration for the
employment
contract.
The
employee's performance of service pursuant to the
employer's offer constitutes both the employee's
acceptance of the offer and the employee's consideration
for the contract.

Johnsonr 818 P.2d at 1002, siting Corbin, Corbin on Contracts, §21
(1963). (Emphasis added.)

4

Seef e.g.r Utah Code Ann. §§ 34-21-1 and 34-28-1 et seg.
(1994) which provide for attorneys' fees and other remedies in
actions for compensation earned but not timely paid.
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Zions1 claim that it had no contract with Mrs. Cook and that,
therefore, her earned sick leave cannot be compensation pursuant to
an employment contract, is contrary to both Utah law and general
legal principles governing employment relationships. An employee's
compensation is not necessarily limited to salary, but will include
any other benefits that are an integral part of the employee's
contemplated compensation.

These benefits may include sick leave.

Accord Auclair v. Allstate Ins. Co. f 392 A.2d 1193, 1196 (N.H.

1978); Jeannont v. New Hampshire Personnel Comm'n/ 392 A.2d 1193,
1196 (N.H. 1978) (sick leave benefits are an integral part of the
contemplated compensation); Christian Y» County Of Ontario, 399
N.Y.S.2d 379, 381 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977) (sick leave benefits are
generally

considered

to be a part of an employeefs

overall

compensation); City of Orange v. Chancer 325 S.W.2d 838, 841 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1959) (the fact that a part of an employee's compensation
is called "sick leave" is of no material fact); Vangilder v. City
of Jacksonf

492 S.W.2d 15, 17 (Mo Ct. App. 1973) (sick leave

benefits are generally considered to be a part of the employees
overall compensation, earned during the period of his employment
and forming a part of his employment contract); and Logue v. City
of Carthage, 612 S.W.2d 148, 150 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (sick leave
benefits are to be considered compensation for services and are not
to be viewed as a bonus or an arbitrary award) .
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Thus, even

assuming Mrs. Cook is employed at-willf her earned sick leave
benefit is not a mere gratuity, but constitute compensation for the
services she has rendered.
C.

Mrs. Cook's Express Contract Could Also Be Viewed as an
Implied Contract Created by the Parties1 Course of
Dealings.

Zions1

position

is that

an employer's

long history

of

providing compensation, including the benefit of sick leave, in
consideration for services performed by an employee could not, as
a matter of law, create an implied contract requiring compensation
for the services previously performed.

Specifically, Zions argues

that *[b]ecause plaintiff's implied-in-fact contract claim does not
involve termination issues, her cause of action is not recognized
under Utah law and must be dismissed." (R. at 71) .5 Zions undertook
an

extensive

effort to cite employment-at-will

termination cases to the trial court.

and wrongful

(R. at 71; 393-98.)

By so

doing, Zions has confused the nature of Mrs. Cook's claims and
5

As set forth on pages 17-18 supra, the "at-will" nature of
Mrs. Cook's employment with Zions simply means that her employment
contract does not have a specific duration. To allege that because
this case does not involve termination issues, she therefore has no
contract, either express or implied, is patently incorrect and
misleading.
Situations of employment at-will are simply
u
employment contracts
[that] are terminable at the will of either
party . . . ". Gilmore v. Salt Lake Area Community Action Program,
775 P.2d 940, 942 (Utah App. , 1989), cert, denied, 789 P.2d 33
(Utah 1990). (Emphasis added.) Since neither Zions nor Mrs. Cook
sought to terminate her employment before the contract breach
occurred, the "at-will" nature of that employment contract is
irrelevant.
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obtained a ruling which would, if affirmed, eliminate an employer's
obligation to pay and otherwise compensate its employees after the
employees have performed their assigned duties in reliance on the
employees promise of compensation.
The Utah Supreme Court in Berube specifically held that the
parties1 course of dealing may establish an implied contractual
term, stating that "[t]he conclusion that [an implied in fact]
promise exists may arise from a variety of sources, including the
conduct of the parties, announced personnel policies, practices of
that particular trade or industry, or other circumstances which
show the existence of such a promise."

Berubef 771 P.2d at 1044.

Berube further held that "continued performance of the employeefs
duties is adequate consideration for . . .

an implied contract

provision."

In addition to the

Berubef 771 P. 2d at 1044.

Employment Agreement and Zions express representations, all of the
possible sources of an implied contract listed in Berube exist in
the instant case.
These facts demonstrate that the parties agreed that the
ability to take paid sick leave, when needed and as accrued, was
part of the compensation agreed to be provided to Mrs. Cook in
connection with her employment with Zions.
This Court has defined

an implied

contract

as "a tacit

promise, one that is inferred in whole or in part from expressions
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other than words on the part of the promisor."
Inc. v. Hertfordf

Allstate Enter. f

772 P.2d 466, 468 (Utah App. 1989)

Corbinf supra at §§ 17 and 38).

Even assuming, arguendo,

document referred to herein as the

(Citing.
that the

Employment Agreement is not a

binding written agreement between the parties, it is at the very
least evidence of a tacit agreement between the parties concerning
compensation in the form of paid sick leave.

This Court held in

Piston v. EnviroPak Medical Products, Inc., 893 P. 2d 1071, 1075
(Utah App. 1995) , that "the lack of a written agreement does not
mean that there was no enforceable agreement."
Addressing the issue of implied contracts in general, this
Court has defined the
elements of such a contract as being: (1) the defendant
requested the plaintiff to perform work;
(2) the
plaintiff expected the defendant to compensate him or her
for those services; and (3) the defendant knew or should
have known that the plaintiff expected compensation. See
Kintz v. Read, 626 P.2d 52, 55 (Wash. App. 1981); See
alSQ Restatement (Second) of Contracts Sec. 5 comment (a)
(1981) (providing that terms of promise or agreement are
those expressed in language of parties or implied in fact
from other conduct).
Davies v. Olsonf 746 P.2d 264, 269 (Utah App. 1987).

In reliance

on Zions1 employment offer, Mrs. Cook worked for several years
accruing sick leave and receiving it when needed, until February,
1994.

Throughout

her

employment,

Zions

has

maintained

an

accounting of the amount of involuntary sick leave which Mrs. Cook
accrued and used.

These facts and all inferences therefrom,
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construed in Mrs. Cook's favor, demonstrate the existence of an
implied contract under the standard set forth in Pavies.
D.

Whether or Not a Term of Compensation Represents a
Contractual Right Between an Employer and an Employee
Depends on Whether That Term Is Definite.

"The requirement that a contract be sufficiently definite is
a functional requirement from the parties1 perspective in terms of
whether it can be performed, and from the courts1 perspective in
terms of whether it can be enforced." Pistonf 893 P.2d at 1075
(holding that an oral agreement for compensation evidenced in part
by a letter of intent was reached and therefore enforceable between
the parties.)

In this case, the contract term providing for paid

sick leave was functionally definite because it was performed by
the parties for several years until February, 1994.

Zions has

admitted that its employees earn sick leave as part of their
compensation (R. at 332-33); and that full time employees earn the
right to use sick leave and can accumulate eight hours a month for
a maximum of twelve days a year.

(R. at 325; 334; 344.)

In Mrs.

Cooks1 case, at the beginning of 1994, she had 249.76 hours of
unused and available sick leave.

(R. at 336-37.)

The agreement

providing for earned sick leave was definite and understood by the
parties, and was in fact performed by them for many years.
The

second

enforceability.

requirement

set

forth

in Piston

relates to

In Piston this Court cited with approval Bunnell
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v. Bills, 13 Utah 2d 83, 86, 368 P. 2d 597, 600 (1962), where the
Utah Supreme Court held that "a contract can be enforced by the
courts only if the obligations of the parties are set forth with
sufficient definiteness that it can be performed."
cited the Restatement supra

Piston also

at § 33, which provides that a[t]he

terms of the contract are reasonably certain if they provide a
basis of determining the existence of a breach and for giving an
appropriate remedy."

Piston 893 P. 2d at 1075-76.

Thus, as long

as the agreement is definite enough to allow the finder of fact to
determine whether one party has breached it, and to award some kind
of reasonable damages to the wronged party, the contract is not
void for indefiniteness.6 Therefore, the contract for compensation
between Mrs. Cook and Zions is enforceable because, in addition to
being performable, the obligation of the parties was sufficiently
definite for the trier of fact to determine its terms, the
existence of a breach and an appropriate remedy.
1.

Zions Breached a Definite Agreement with Mrs.
Cook Which Allowed Her to Request and Use Sick
Leave When Needed.

6

"Once a defendant has been shown to have caused a loss, he
should not be allowed to escape liability because the amount of the
loss cannot be proved with precision . . . Consequently, the
reasonable level of certainty required to establish the amount of
a loss is generally lower than that required to establish the fact
or cause of a loss." Cook Assoc. r Inc. v. Warnickf 664 P.2d 1161,
1166 (Utah 1983) (Internal citations omitted.)
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In order to determine the existence of a breach and an
appropriate remedy, it is crucial to understand what was actually
bargained

for by the parties*

Mrs. Cook

entered

into her

employment with Zions in part because of the flexibility offered by
paid sick leave.

This was a significant part of Mrs. Cook's

compensation package, and was an important inducement to her.
at 438.)

(R.

In fact, Mrs. Cook was willing to work at an hourly rate

lower than what she received from her former employer because
Zions* compensation package included paid sick leave.
39.)

(R. at

438-

Because paid sick leave and the ability to use it when needed

is of great value to its employees, Zions, like many other
employers, offers its employees paid sick leave in order to be
competitive and to promote the health of its employees.

(R. at

325.)
Zions clearly knew the importance of sick leave as it related
to Mrs. Cook's health when it offered her employment.

Ms. Misdom,

an officer of the bank and the representative who signed Mrs.
Cook's Employment Agreement, testified as follows:
Q.
So, the bank's sick day or short leave of absence
policy is designed, is it not, to be used by employees
who need to schedule medical treatment?
A.

Yes.

Q.
And the purpose of allowing them to be able to
schedule medical treatment would be so they can resolve
medical problems before they become more serious?
25

MS. BAAR:

Objection, assumes facts not in evidence.

MR. HOOLE:

Let's let her answer the question.

THE WITNESS:

I would think so, yes.

Q.
(By Mr. Hoole) In any event, as a supervisor, would
it be your practice to allow your subordinates time off
if they needed medical care in order to avoid a situation
becoming more serious?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And would you use the bank's policy for that?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Is it your understanding that that's what the policy is

A.

Yes.
•

•

•

Q.
Okay. Is it your understanding that if an employee
is not allowed time off for medical care that the
employee['s] situation may become more serious?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Potentially life-threatening?
MS. BAAR:

Objection.

THE WITNESS:

Same objection.

Potentially it could be.

Q.
(By Mr. Hoole) In any event, the policy is designed
to prevent that type of thing from happening?
MS. BAAR:

Same objection.

THE WITNESS:

Also, lack of foundation.

I would think so, yes.

at 471-72.)
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In the Employment Agreement, Zions described sick leave as
"Involuntary".7 (R. at 441; Addendum "B".)

This indicates Zions1

intent to grant Mrs. Cook the right to request and receive sick
Mrs. Cookfs ability to request time off for

leave when required.

medical care was the very essence of Zions1 sick leave policy and
the bargain

between

nonperformance

of

Restatement, supra

a

the parties.
legal

duty

at § 235(2).

A breach
when

due

of

under

contract
a

is

contract.

Obviously, sick leave, once

earned, is due when an employee is sick or in need of medical care.
In this case, what was bargained for and agreed by the parties
was the ability to receive sick leave when needed.

When Zions

prevented Mrs. Cook from taking one day off work through most of
February, March, April and May of 1994 in order to have a lump on
her

lip removed

and biopsied

it breached

a performable and

enforceable term of her employment compensation agreement.

Given

the performability of Mrs. Cook's compensation agreement, Zions1
breach, and the trial courtfs ability to enforce the contact, the
issue becomes whether a reasonable jury, properly instructed in the
law, could determine an appropriate remedy.

7

Webster's New World Dictionary defines "involuntary" as: "a)
not done of one's own free will; not done by choice; b)
unintentional; accidental; c) not consciously
controlled;
automatic." Webster's New World Dictionary, 742 (2d College Ed.,
1984.) The word "involuntary" in this context, strongly suggests
the right to request and use sick leave when needed.
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2.

Mrs. Cook Is Entitled to an Appropriate Remedy
Based on Those Damages Reasonably Foreseeable
or Within the Reasonable Contemplation of the
Parties at the Time They Entered into the
Employment Compensation Contract.

In reliance on Beck v, Farmers Ins, Excht, 701 P.2d 795 (Utah
1985), the Utah Supreme Court in Berubef 771 P.2d at 1050, stated
that plaintiffs who prevail in employment cases may recover damages
for general and consequential injuries resulting from the breach of
an employment contract.

Berube further stated that

[b]oth general and consequential damages are available
for contract breaches, and consequential damages are
•those reasonably within the contemplation of, or
reasonably foreseeable by, the parties at the time the
contract was made.1 Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch. r 701 P.
2d at 801. Of course, • [t]he foreseeability of any such
damages will always hinge upon the nature and language of
the contract and the reasonable expectations of the
parties.1 Id. (Citing J. Calamari & J. Perillo, Contracts
§ 14-5, at 523-25 (2d ed. 1977.))
Berube, 771 P.2d at 1050.
This Court, in Heslop Vt Bank Of Utah, 839 P.2d 828, 840 (Utah
App.

1992) , noted

that

"Bsck

envisioned

a

broad

range

of

recoverable damages for breach of the covenant of good faith and
fair dealing in a first-party insurance contract.[8]
8

Similarly,

In Beckf the Supreme Court held that a[a]lthough the policy
limits define the amount for which the insurer may be held
responsible in performing the contract, they do not define the
amount for which it may be liable upon a breach." Beckf 701 P.2d at
801. Accordingly, the Court noted that
[i]n an action for breach of a duty to bargain in good
faith, a broad range of recoverable damages is
conceivable, particularly given the unique nature and
28

Berube envisioned a broad range of recoverable damages in an
implied-in-fact contract of employment . . .". Heslop, 839 P.2d at
840. In Heslop this Court reasoned that a[t]erminated employees,
like injured insurance claimants, find themselves in a particularly
vulnerable position once the employer breaches the employment
agreement."9

Heslopf 839 P.2d at 840. This same reasoning should

apply in this instance where Zions breached its contractual duty by
not allowing Mrs. Cook one day off for a surgical procedure, thus
putting her in the dilemma of obtaining the requested medical
treatment only if she were willing to risk losing her employment
and health insurance.

Zions has admitted that the purpose of

allowing employees time off work for medical procedures is to help
its employees obtain necessary medical attention, diagnosis and

purpose of an insurance contract. An insured frequently
faces catastrophic consequences if funds are not
available within a reasonable period of time to cover an
insured loss; damages for losses well in excess of the
policy limits, such as for a home or a business, may
therefore be foreseeable and provable.
Beckr 701 P.2d at 802. The Court further found "no difficulty with
the proposition that, in unusual cases, damages for mental anguish
might [also] be provable." 3&£&, 701 P.2d at 802. As a result of
Zions1 denying Mrs. Cook's requests for time off for necessary
medical treatment, Mrs. Cook has suffered emotional distress,
marked changes in her normal life and is currently in a struggle to
save her life. (R. at 254.)
9

There is no reason why Berube's analysis of consequential
damages for breaches of implied-in-fact contracts should not be
equally applicable in the context of express employment agreements.
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treatment

before

threatening.

health

problems

become

serious

or

life

(R. at 325; 471-472.) Jury questions therefore exist

on the issues of whether there is a contract, whether that contract
was

breached,

and

what

are

the

foreseeable

general

and

consequential damages flowing from that breach.
E.

Zions Cannot Retroactively Disclaim Mrs. Cook's Earned
Compensation.

Zions has taken the position that any employment agreement
retroactively

between it and Mrs. Cook relating to compensation was
disclaimed by an employee handbook. Zions states that

the handbook clearly and conspicuously states that
employees should understand that neither party has
entered into any employment contract, express or implied
. . . By [the words of this disclaimer], Zions clearly
disclaimed any intent to enter into an express or implied
employment contract with its employees. Under these
circumstances, no contract could exist.
(R. at 400-01.)
flawed.

However, Zions1 disclaimer argument is fatally

It is undisputed that Mrs. Cook did not receive any

handbook until April 8, 1994.

(R. at 251; 306.)

A copy of the

Employee Handbook Signature page, signed by Mrs. Cook and dated
April 8, 1994, is attached hereto as Addendum "D".
In Hamilton v. Parkdale

(R. at 346.)

Care Centerf Inc.r75 Utah Adv. Rep.

32 (Utah App. October 12, 1995) (a wrongful termination case where,
at the commencement of employment, the employee received and
acknowledged

a

copy

of the

employerfs

handbook

and

at-will

disclaimer), this Court observed that "Utah courts have held that
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a clear and conspicuous disclaimer in an employee handbook negates
an employee's contention that the employment relationship is other
than at will."

Hamilton, 275 Utah Adv. Rep. at 33.

Although

Hamilton was an at-will case, it is instructive here.
First, since no handbook was given to Mrs. Cook until April 8,
1994, no disclaimer could have been "clear or conspicuous", as
required by Hamiltonr before that time.10

By April 8, 1994, Mrs.

Cook's requests for sick leave had already been repeatedly denied.
Therefore, any disclaimer in the handbook is irrelevant.
Second, Zions' disclaimer claim is fundamentally unfair and
without merit.

Zions, through its handbook, cannot retroactively

disclaim earned compensation, nor should it be able to change,
disclaim

or revoke sick leave after

requested.

it has vested and been

In Loguef the Missouri Court of Appeals held that an

employer's act of changing the terms of its sick leave policy could
not act to strip an employee of the benefits which had accrued to
him prior to such alteration.

Loguer 612 S.W.2d at 151. Here the

10

The trial court ignored the requirement that a disclaimer
be conspicuous, and stated that although she did not know and was
not aware of the disclaimer, Mrs. Cook was nevertheless somehow
charged with knowledge of its contents, stating that w[e]ven though
Ms. Cook denies receiving the handbook until April 8# 1994 she
certainly
knows before receipt
and after that such a book contains
only 'guidelines' for company and employee relations and
expectations and cannot be construed to create greater contractual
liability." (Citation and footnote omitted; Emphasis added) (R. at
479.)
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record is clear that Zions has never even attempted to change the
terms of Mrs. Cook's sick leave.

(R. at 250-51; 304.) The

handbook's statement of Zions1 sick leave policy, rather than
changing that policy, simply confirms the compensation agreement
and practices Mrs. Cook had already relied on for six years.
at 116-17.)

(R.

Moreover, the Employment Agreement states that only

*[u]pon termination of employment [will sick leave] . . benefits .
. . be forfeited."

(R. at 441; Addendum "B\)

Third, any purported disclaimer in an employment manual is
ineffective in retroactively refuting the essence of the employment
relationship itself, i.e., the existence of a contract related to
compensation for services rendered.

As stated in Kirberg v. West

One Bankf 872 P.2d 39, 40 (Utah App. 1994), disclaimers can be
modified by an expressed or implied agreement.

See Perry v.

Sindermannf 408 U.S. 593, 603, (1972) (employer's de facto and
written policies may create an employment contract even where a
policy manual states the contrary).

Agreements regarding an

employee's compensation are not the types of promises an employer
should be able to retroactively disclaim.

Nevertheless, a review

of the handbook disclaimer, (R. at 106), shows that what Zions is
attempting to avoid is an employee's ability to rebut the at-will
presumption, not an employee's right to receive compensation.
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Zions1 claim that the handbook disclaimer allows it to void
all

of its obligations to its employees would operate as a fraud

upon the employees.

Once Mrs. Cook earned and accrued sick leave

by performing her duties as an employee of Zions, Zions cannot deny
her that compensation under the guise of an "at-will" disclaimer.
Nor could Zions rely on that disclaimer to refuse to give an
employee earned salary, health insurance, life insurance, vacation
pay# pension funds, or any other form of compensation, once that
compensation

is due to an employee.

The at-will nature of

employment allows an employer to prospectively

change the terms of

that employment, or to terminate the relationship altogether, but
it does not allow an employer to deny compensation already due.
III. The Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Exists Within the
Confines of All Contracts, Including Employment Compensation
Agreements•
Zions argued to the trial court that "in the employment
context, an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is not
recognized

under

Utah

law."

(R. at

71.)

To

support

this

representation, Zions cited three cases: Brehanyf 812 P.2d at 49;
Heslopr 839 P.2d at 828; and Loose v. Nature-All Corp.P 785 P.2d
1096 (Utah 1989).

Notwithstanding Zions1 misstatement of the law,

both the Utah Supreme Court and this Court have held that the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing does
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exist within the

confines of all contracts, including employment contracts.

The

Utah Supreme Court in Heslopr citing Brehany which in turn cited
Loose, stated that
covenant

"every

of good faith."

contract

is

subject

to

an

implied

Heslopf 839 P.2d at 840 (Emphasis added).

In Dubois v. Grand Centralr 872 P.2d 1073 (Utah App. 1994), citing
Heslop and Brehanyf this Court specifically stated that *[n]one of
these cases have held that there is not an implied covenant of good
faith and

fair dealing

in either at-will or other sorts of

employment contracts." Duboisf 872 P.2d at 1078. The Dubois court
clearly reaffirmed the concept that the "implied covenant [of good
faith and fair dealing] protects an employee from denial of rights
under the contract . . . w.

Duboisf 872 P.2d at 1078-79.**

The cases cited by Zions simply provide that the implied
covenant

of good

faith

and

fair dealing

does not

limit an

employer's right to terminate an otherwise at-will employee, not
that the implied covenant of good faith does not exist.

Zions

misconstrued Brehanyf He1sop and Loose as extinguishing any implied
11

see e.g Qiympus Hills Center, Ltdt v»

Smith's Food/ 889

P.2d 445 (Utah App. 1994, cert, denied, 899 P.2d 1231 (Utah 1995)
and the cases cited therein.
12

Zions would have us believe that this Court in Dubois was
unable to interpret the relevant decisions of the Utah Supreme
Court, arguing that the Dubois opinion must "give way to the higher
authority of the Supreme Court."
(R. at 404.) However, it is
clear that Dubois and the Utah Supreme Court's decision cited
therein are consistent in holding that the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing exists in all contracts.
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covenant of good faith in the employment context may have misled
the trial court.
The covenant of good faith and fair dealing arises because
"contracting parties, hard as they may try# cannot reduce every
understanding to a stated term."

Olympus Hillsr 889 P.2d at 450.

Therefore, "[t]he good faith question often arises because a
contract is an exchange expressed imperfectly and projected into an
uncertain future.

Contract parties rely on the good faith of their

exchange partners because detailed planning may be ineffectual or
inadvisable." Steven J. Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common
Law Duty to Perform in Good Faithr 94 Har. L.Rev. 369, 371 (1980).
Although the covenant of good faith and fair dealing exists
within every contract, the Heslop decision correctly held that the
"covenant cannot be construed fto establish new, independent rights
or duties not agreed upon by the parties.1"

Heslopr 839 P.2d at

840, citing Brehanyf 812 P.2d at 55. Mrs. Cook has not sought to
use

the

implied

covenant

of

good

faith

independent contractual rights or duties.

to

establish

new,

Her claim is that Zions

has violated its obligation of good faith and fair dealing in its
performance of her employment agreement by repeatedly denying
necessary time off for diagnostic medical treatment.
Because

Zions

requires

its

employees

to

notify

their

departmental supervisors of the need to take sick leave for medical
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procedures, (R. at 221),

and requires them to obtain approval

before they can schedule medical treatment, (R. at 344; 471-72)#
Zions

has

reserved

for

itself,

discretion to approve sick leave.

rightly

or wrongly,

limited

To the extent Zions exercised

discretion by denying Mrs. Cook sick leave, it had an obligation to
do so in good faith, for the covenant of good faith limits "the
exercise of discretion in performance conferred on one party by the
contract."

Burton, supra,

at 372-73.

The covenant of good faith

and fair dealing may thus "be used to protect a 'weaker1 party from
a 'stronger1 party."

Burton, supra,

at 383.13

Although Zions did require Mrs. Cook to obtain approval before
taking time off for scheduled medical treatment, (R. at 344; 47172) , the limit of its discretion in denying her requests was
clearly set forth in its Newsbreak statement: "Zions policies
provide
treatment."

employees with adequate

time

to

seek

needed

medical

(R. at 349; Addendum "C".) (Emphasis added.)

In this

statement, Zions1 has admitted that it should have allowed Mrs.
Cook "adequate time to seek needed medical treatment", but despite
her repeated requests, unfortunately did not.

13

Therefore, a trier

The covenant of good faith and fair dealing is mutual.
Just as employees could abuse their right to sick leave and lose
their employment, conversely, an employer could abuse its
discretion by denying sick leave to the injury of its employee, for
which the employer would be liable under the covenant of good faith
and fair dealing.
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of fact could find that Zions acted in a manner that, by its own
standard, violated the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
IV.

The Trial Court Erred By Not Finding Genuine Issues of
Material Fact as to Zions' Performance under the Implied
Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing.
Mrs. Cook claims that Zions acted in bad faith by preventing

her from using one day of her earned sick leave for nearly four
months.

This Court has held that "good faith and fair dealing are

fact sensitive concepts, and whether there has been a breach of
good

faith

and

fair

dealing

is a

factual

issue, generally

inappropriate for decision as a matter of law." Republicf 883 P.2d

at 281. See also Western Farm Credit Bank v, Pratt/ 860 p.2d 376,
380

(Utah

App.

1993),

cert.

denied,

879

P.2d

266

(Utah

1994)(whether a party has breached the covenant of good faith and
fair dealing is generally a factual issue to be determined by the
fact finder, not an issue subject to resolution as matter of law) ;
Corbin, supra

at § 654B (if a dispute exists concerning a duty of

good faith as to why contractual parties did what they did, there
is a question of fact for the fact finder).

Whether Zions did in

fact breach its duty under the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing is a factual issue which should be decided by a trier of
fact.
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V.

The Trial Court Erred by Resolving Factual Disputes Against
Mrs. Cook and by Relying on Issues Neither Raised by Zions Nor
Properly Considered in a Motion for Summary Judgment.
A.

The Trial Court Failed Use a Proper Rule 56 Analysis.

The Tenth Circuit, consistent with Utah law, has held that
[w]hen applying [the Rule 56(c)] standard, we examine the
factual record and reasonable inferences therefrom in the
light most favorable to the party opposing summary
judgment. [Citation omitted.] If there is no genuine
issue of material fact in dispute, then we next determine
if the substantive law was correctly applied by the
district court.

Hirase-Doi v, UtSt West Communications, Inct, 61 F.3d 777, 781
(10th Cir. 1995).14

The trial court did not apply this standard.

Rather than deciding whether factual issues exist as to the
formation and performance of the contract

under the Rule 56

standard, the trial court erred by construing facts against Mrs.
Cook, and then using those misconstrued facts to draw invalid legal
conclusions.
court held
opportunity

For example, in its Memorandum Decision, the trial
that Mrs Cookfs
to

utilize

her

verification in the facts."

"claim that
accrued

sick

(R. at 479.)

14

she was denied
leave

is

the

without

The trial court made

Reference to federal cases and the federal advisory
committee notes is pertinent to give meaning and effect to the
Utah rules. Hansen v. Heath, 852 P.2d 977, 979 (Utah 1993). When
interpreting the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Utah courts will
look to the express language of the Utah Rules and, to the extent
that they are similarly worded, to the Federal Rules and cases
interpreting them. First Security Bank of Utah Nat'l Ass'n v.
Conlinr 817 P.2d 298, 299 (Utah 1991).
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this

conclusion

notwithstanding

the

obvious

factual

dispute

involving Mrs. Cook's claims that she made several requests for
time off which were denied, and Zions' claim that no such requests
or denials ever occurred.
facts against
B.

The trial court clearly interpreted

Mrs. Cook, instead of in her favor.

The Trial Court Erred in Raising the Issue of Mitigation
of Damages.

Without specifically ruling on the issue of mitigation of
damages, the trial court's decision seems to rely on Mrs. Cook's
"failure" to take the day off without her supervisor's permission.
(R. at 480.)

The record indicates that Mrs. Cook's delay in

seeking medical treatment was not voluntary. She feared that she
would be terminated in accordance with Zions' policies if she
blatantly disregarded her supervisor's directive to remain at work
during a period of time when her workload was exceptionally heavy.
Not knowing whether she had a medical problem, Mrs. Cook acted
reasonably under the circumstances by maintaining her employment
and insurance while continuing to make requests for time off.
In ruling that Mrs. Cook should simply have refused to delay
her surgery, the trial court made a factual determination that she
failed to mitigate the damages caused by Zions' breach.

The issue

of mitigation of damages was improperly considered by the trial
court, because not only is mitigation a factual question, it was
not raised by Zions in support of its Motion for Summary Judgment.
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It

is well

reasonable

settled

efforts

to

that a *[p]laintiff 's duty to make

mitigate

damages

does

not

extend

to

subjecting oneself to undue risk and expense . . . whether efforts
were reasonable or potential risk and expense were undue are
questions of fact . . .M. Gates v. City of Tenakee Springs,, 822
P.2d 455, 460 (Alaska 1991) (Citations omitted).
Ferguson, Inc. v. Stower 686 P.2d 604 (Wyo 1984).

See alsor Massey
Accord

Reid v.

Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co.f776 P.2d 896 (Utah 1989) (financial burden
can be an excuse for failure to.mitigate);

Mildon v. Bybeef 375

P.2d 458, 461 (Utah 1962) ("the objective commercial reasonableness
of mitigation efforts is a fact question . . ..")
Finally, Mrs. Cook has not been deposed nor allowed the
opportunity to testify. Therefore, the facts related to mitigation
are not yet fully known and should not have considered below.
CONCLUSION
Mrs. Cook has alleged that she bargained for, and entered into
an agreement with Zions which allowed her paid sick leave when
needed.
implied.

Zions has denied that they made any agreement, express or
The trial court, instead of construing the facts

indicating the existence of an express or implied agreement in
favor

of Mrs. Cook, relied

on the at-will nature of their

relationship and ruled that no employment agreement existed as a
matter of law.

The court further found that the implied covenant
40

of good faith and fair dealing does not exist within employment
compensation contracts.
Construing all facts, and all inferences in favor of Mrs.
Cook, there is ample evidence for a reasonable jury to find that
the

parties

entered

into

a

binding

agreement

concerning

compensation which was breached in bad faith, causing damages.
Therefore, Zions was not entitled to summary judgment. The judgment
granted in Zions1 favor must be overturned and this case remanded
for a determination of factual issues.
DATED this 27th day of November, 1995.
HOOLE & KING, L.C.

/ , )i9*i i-i. / y . A ^
'-SOGER H./ HOOLE '
PAUL M./KING
HEATHER/E. MORRISON
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that on the 27th day of November, 1995,
four copies of the foregoing were hand-delivered to the following:
Lois A. Baar
Parsons, Behle & Latimer
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
m AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM
DECISION

ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK
Defendant.

CASE # 940905799

GINA COOK
vs.

This matter came before the Court on a second oral Argument of Counsel as to the
Defendant's "Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Court Proceedings or in the Alternative
for Summary Judgment Dismissing Plaintiffs Case." The matter was first argued March 10,
1995 but due to the Court's lengthy calendar on that date, Counsel for plaintiff was
concerned as to the adequacy of time to present the Plaintiffs position and also thereafter
was concerned that they needed to provide the Court with supplemental material. The matter
was set for further argument April 21, 1994 , at 9:00 A.M. The Plaintiff was represented by
Roger Hoole, who argued the case, and by Heather Morrison and Paul King. The Defendant
was represented by Lois Baar, who argued the case, and Michael Zody.
The Court heart the arguments of Counsel, took the matter under advisement, and
herein renders its
MEMORANDUM DECISION.
The single issue in the case is whether there is a legal basis for the Plaintiff to blame
Zions Bank for the consequences of the Plaintiff not obtaining a medical day off as
authorized by the Bank's medical leave policy and as accrued to the Plaintiff through her

0**047*

length of employment. Ms. Cook claims the bank failed to allow her time for medical leave
for surgery to remove and biopsy a growth in her lip. The bank disputes it.
The factual setting is as follows:
1.

Plaintiff was employed by Zions bank in May of 1988 at a rate of $6.00 per

hour. She has thereafter received appropriate increases in compensation.
2.

While Plaintiff was initially a part-time employee, she later accepted full-time

employment. She was entitled to accrue for medical absence, while working part-time at
over twenty (20) hours per week, one-half (1/2) day per month; and, while working full-time
she accrued one (1) day per month. There is no dispute she had accrued sufficient time to
cover her absence for the surgery.
3.

Plaintiff was hired as an "at-will" employee and remains employed at this

4.

On January 29, 1994, Plaintiff requested and was authorized to take "...one

time.

hour of time off" to visit her doctor on February 1, 1994 to have "...the lump on my lip
removed."1
5.

The time was granted, the appointment was met, but the Doctor "...decided

1

See the Affidavit of Gina Cook signed January 20, 1995, and Exhibit 12 attached to
"Plainfiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment." The
court notes that on Exhibit 12 was the further authorization to see Dr. Griffith regarding an
allergy appointment apparently scheduled and rescheduled by the plaintiff. The combined
appointments occupied the time from 8:30 A.M. to 12:00 P.M.
[2]

that the procedure would take a full day and would need to be done in a hospital."
6.

Ms. Cook returned to work and requested a "...full day off for surgery."

7.

Ms. Cook claims she was denied that time off due to the heavy work

requirements imposed upon her and her department during the first few months of 1994. In
fact she states that she asked for additional help in the department and a reduction of the
"overtime" requested but each request was denied by the bank.
8.

Ms. Cook alleges she made further requests for the medical leave which

requests were denied.
9.

On May 20, 1994, the surgery was scheduled, the growth was removed and a

biopsy was performed.
10.

On May 31, 1994 the biopsy revealed "...a form of aggressive, malignant

melanoma."
11.

On June 2, 1994 a second surgery was performed requiring removal of

additional portions of flesh on Ms. Cook's chin and lower lip.
12.

Ms. Cook remained off work for ten and one-half (10 1/2) weeks thereafter

from May 31, 1994 through August 8, 1994.
13.

Apparently Ms. Cook's entire absence was compensated and she remains

employed to this date. The surgery has not seemed to resolve the difficulties and Ms. Cook
may now be facing a terminal illness.
Zions Bank, relevant to its "Motion.. .for Summary Judgment Dismissing Plaintiffs
[3]

Complaint,"2 alleges the following facts:
1.

Plaintiff was employed in May of 1988 and Zions does not enter into any

individual employment agreements with its employees and did not do so with Ms. Cook.
2.

In February of 1994 Zions issued a "handbook" containing the company policy

guidelines regarding attendance, short term absences, and long term absences. The handbook
contains a disclaimer as to creating any express or implied obligations for either the Bank or
its employees.
3.

The handbook advises employees that they are hired as, and remain "at will"

employees.
4.

The handbook contains some of the "...policies, procedures, benefits and other

pertinent information..." to "...serve as a valuable reference"3 to employees.
Ms. Cook's "Complaint (Jury Trial Demanded)" alleges the following Counts:
1.

Breach of Express Employment Contract.

2.

Breach of Implied-In-Fact Employment Contract.

3.

Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing.

2

The motion was titled, "Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Court Proceedings or in
the Alternative for Summary Judgment Dismissing Plaintiffs Case." The request to compel
arbitration was withdrawn March 10, 1995 at the initial oral argument on the matter.
3

see Exhibit A to defendant's "Memorandum in support of Motion to Compel Arbitration
and Stay Court Proceedings or in the Alternative for Summary Judgment Dismissing Plaintiffs
Case."
[4]
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4.

Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress.

Based upon the foregoing, the Court finds and rules as follows:
1.

The first cause of action for "Breach of Express Employment Contract" must

be and the same is dismissed because there is no employment contract between the parties.
Utah law presumes that any employment contract with no specified term as to duration is an
"at-will" relationship. Berube v. Fashion Center. Ltd.. 771 P.2d 1033, (Utah 1989)
Nothing in evidence can be shown to have changed the initial "at-will" relationship.

Even

in cases where an "at-will" employee has no right of action against its employer for breach
of employment contract upon being discharged. (Brehanv v. Nordstrom. Inc.. 812 P.2d 49
[Utah 1991]) in this case, since there has been no discharge, there exists an even stronger
reason to disallow an suit for Breach of Contract. The Plaintiff remains employed yet wishes
to maintain her lawsuit for breach of contract while going to work every day and continuing
to receive employee benefits and income.
2.

The second cause of action for "Breach of Implied-in-Fact Employment

Contract" must be and the same is dismissed because the basis for such a claim is too remote
and speculative to give rise to a contractual agreement.
Within the company "handbook" is contained the statement, "This booklet is not
intended to be an official policies and procedures manual, nor is it intended to create any
express or implied contractual obligations on the part of Zions Bancorporation or its
employees."
[5]
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The court can see no basis to claim that assurances were made to Ms. Cook to cause
her to change her understanding as to her "at-will" employment. Even though Ms. Cook
denies receiving the handbook until April 8, 19944 she certainly knows before receipt and
after that such a book contains only "guidelines" for company and employee relations and
expectations and cannot be construed to create greater contractual liability. (See Hodgson v.
Bunzl Utah. Inc.. 844 P.2d 331, [Utah 1992])
In addition, there can be no cause of action when the employee remains, as she does
here, employed by the Bank. The cases of Berube v. Fashion Centre. Ltd.. 771 P.2d 1033
(Utah 1989) and Kirberg v. West One Bank. 872 P.2d 39 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) each relate
to claims associated with termination which has not occurred in this case. It seems
particularly distasteful to allow an employer and employee to be in litigation with each other
while they must continue to work together daily. Perhaps that is, in part, the reason that
other agencies deal with such work related claims as Workmen's Compensation, etc.
3.

The third cause of action for "Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and

Fair Dealing" must be and the same is herein dismissed. The Plaintiffs claim that she was
denied the opportunity to utilize her accrued sick leave is without verification in the facts.
She received ten and one-half (10 1/2) weeks paid leave when the second surgery was

4

Affidavit of Gina Cook paragraph 8 states, ".. .1 was not given a copy of said employment
handbook until April 8, 1994, nor did I ever receive a copy of any earlier employee handbook.
The Employee Handbook was received and the Signature Page was signed by me on April 8,
1994."
[6]
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performed June 2, 1994. The seeming basis of her claim is that she was asked by the bank
to delay the surgery due to pressures at work. She simply could have refused to do so. She
could simply have set the surgery earlier, informed her supervisor she was taking the time
off, for the surgery and then done so. Had the bank terminated her for such a request, the
case would be quite different. Can or should an employer, when both the employer and
employee are admittedly unaware of the gravity of the employee's health, be subject to suit
for failing to deal fairly and in good faith when the employee requests time for medical care?
The employee bears the primary responsibility to know and understand her own health. She
knew her family medical history and the occurrences of cancer therein. The fact that she
allowed herself to delay the surgery cannot now be the responsibility of her employer. No
one denied her any claims made...indeed, her only present claim is they denied her request
for time off to attend the surgery. The facts of the case don't support that denial just
because she did not schedule the surgery until May 20, 1994.
4.

The fourth cause of action for "Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress"

cannot lie before this court but must be a part of an action, if any, under Workmen's
Compensation. Mounteer v. Utah Power and Light Company. 823 P.2d 1055 (Utah 1991)
Employers are shielded from liability for work related injuries unless their conduct was
intended in some way to be injurious. In this case, since neither the employer nor the
employee knew of the gravity of the medical condition, it cannot be contended that the
employer knew of and/or intended the "injurious act." Lantz v. National Semiconductor
[7]
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Corp.. 775 P.2d 937, (Utah App. 1989)

The earliest anyone knew of the "malignant

melanoma" was May 31, 1994.
The Plaintiffs present medical condition is tragic and can only cause one to feel
empathy and compassion. Unfortunately, it was she or her physician who should have acted
sooner.. .not her employer. An employer is entitled to say that the demands of work are
busy and that they need help...and employees are entitled to say that their medical needs preempt the employers work, and then schedule their appointments appropriately. Had that
occurred this case would not be before the court.
Ms. Baar is requested to prepare an order consistent herewith and with her pleadings
on file herein. If other facts or law are deemed appropriate for inclusion, consistent
herewith, they may be presented.
Dated, June 8, 1995.

[8]
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ZIONS BANCORPORATION and SUBSIDIARIES
Employment Benefits Disclosure and Pay Agreement
Salary Administration
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F,
C.

Bi-weekly pay periods — 26 pay periods per calendar year
Time cards completed by all non-exempt employees (non-supervisory employees)
Each employee will be evaluated in 6 months and 12 months after initial hiring
and at least once each year thereafter.
Pay Rate: $
( P'OO
&$r hour/per month (circle one)
Pay Commences:
~ -?> 1
Normal Workplace:
Working Status:
Select full-time, part-time.
J23L.
or temporary.

-?r

?-735C-

List of Potential Benefits
A.
Involuntary Absence from Work (leave credit 90-day waiting period) —
1 day per month for full-time employees; 1 day (8 hours) per 2 months
for those working at least 20 hours per week.
B.
Long-term Disability (full-time, 25 years old 6 1 year service) — standard
plan
C.
Medical Insurance — self-funded or choice of health maintenance organizations where available. 20 hours per week qualifies for employee coverage;
32 hours per week for employee-dependent coverage.
D.
Croup Term Life Insurance — 20 hours per week or 1000 hours per year
E.
Accidental Death 6 Dismemberment Insurance — 20 hours per week or 1000
hours per year
F.
Retirement 6 Pension Plan — 1000 hours per y e a r , 21 years old 6 1 year
service
C.
Stock Plans — 1000 hours per y e a r , 21 years old 6 1 year service
H.
Paid Holidays — compensation for normally scheduled number of hours
I.
Vacation — compensation for normally scheduled number of hours
J.
Service Charge Exempt — checking account at Zions Bank
K.
Service Charge Exempt — travelers checks, cashiers checks 6 gift checks
at Zions Bank
L.
Safe Deposit Box — rental free at Zions Bank
M.
Reduced rates on Zions Bank MasterCard, V I S A , company-sponsored I n stalment Loans and Home Equity Credit Line (min. 6 months service), and
Mortgage Loans (min. 1 year service)
N.
Discount rates on special attractions periodically available.
Inquire at
Personnel Department.
O.
Movie Tickets — discount prices
P.
Educational Assistance Programs
Q.
Savings Plans — automatic deductions to Savings Account, IRA 6 Payroll
Savings Bonds
R.
Employee Money Market Plan
S.
Automatic paycheck deposit to personal checking account
T.
Job Posting Program
U.
Earned Income Credit
V.
Upon termination of employment all the above-mentioned benefits will be
forfeited.
Note: Insurance Plans C , D 6 E are subject to waiting period of 60 days, The i n surance forms must be completed at least by the 31st day after eligibility; otherwise.
a medical exam may be necessary to become eligible.
III.

Certification
The above documents, agreements and benefits have been explained to me. I
understand them and have been given the opportunity to enroll In the programs
for which I am eligible. This Agreement does NOT constitute enrollment in the
benefit programs found In Section I I .
/
I understand
i t I have the right to terminate my emp!oyment at any time and
the com pan
Stains a ^ i m i l a r r i g h t .

5 ^ ? . ( <^<

Employee's Signature
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JNewsbreak
ZIONS WEEKLY NEWS UPDATE

Vol. 2, No. 38
September 20, 1994

ZIONS BANK RESPONDS TO LAWSUIT
Several news stories have appeared on television and in newspapers during the past
few days regarding a lawsuit filed by a Zions Bank employee. The lawsuit alleges that Zions
Bank prevented the employee from taking time off work to obtain appropriate medical care,
resulting in a severe medical problem. Zions Bank issued a statement, expressing sympathy
for our employee and for her family.
She has developed a difficult medical problem. However, after investigating the
claims contained in her lawsuit, Zions First National Bank categorically denies that her
failure to seek timely medical attention was caused by Zions Bank. The Company believes
that neither Zions Bank nor any of its managers have prevented her from seeing a doctor.
The health and welfare of employees are important to Zions Bancorporation. Zions
policies provide employees with adequate time to seek needed medical treatment.
ZIONS ANNOUNCES FORMATION OF ZIONS EMPLOYEE SERVICE TEAM ("ZEST)
Harris Simmons, President and CEO, announced yesterday the formation of the new
Zions Employee Service Team, or "ZEST' for
short.
Zions employees who participate in
ZEST will have many opportunities throughout
the year to help individuals in need and to Zionj Employee Service
Team
serve their communities. "Zions employees have
a great tradition of helping their neighbors,11 said Mr. Simmons. "Zest will help to identify
needs, alert interested Zions employees, and organize the manpower to help meet those
needs. In this way, more Zions employees can involve themselves in truly making a
difference in our communities. That's what ZEST is all about."
Bret D. Passey, manager of the Layton Antelope Drive office, has been named as
chairman of ZEST. According to Bret, "Employees can participate in a variety of ZEST
projects, including the annual Paint-a-Thon, donations to needy families, and other
charitable and community-oriented events. We'll keep everyone informed about
opportunities to participate in ZEST projects."
The purpose of ZEST is to allow more Zions employees to participate in community
service projects. Because many branches and departments organize their own service
projects, the formation of ZEST will allow more involvement in those projects by other
Zions employees. Watch for ZEST announcements in Teller

EMPLOYEE HANDBOOK SIGNATURE PAGE
We are providing you with a copy of Zions Employee
Handbook to assist you in understanding Zions' employee
benefits and important policies and procedures. This Handbook is an important tool to refer to, as questions arise.
To insure that you do not miss the opportunity to participate in the employee benefits which suit you, please read
the employee benefits leaflets in the inside of the back cover
of the Handbook. These leaflets explain, among other
things, enrollment deadlines.
A summary of various policies and procedures are found
on the numbered pages of the Handbook. See your Branch
or Department Manager for full details of policies and procedures.
Please understand that this Handbook is subject to
change and that change in policies may supersede, modify
or eliminate the policies in this booklet
We hope the Handbook will be of assistance to you.
Please sign below acknowledging receipt of the Handbook
and your understanding of Hs significance to your employment.

